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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
THE LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY FOR THE
CONTRACTS AND TORTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE
T HE purpose of this article is to set out, as briefly as possible,
the liability of the husband's separate property, the wife's
separate property, ordinary community property and "special"
community property for the prenuptial and postnuptial debts and
torts of the husband and the wife. It is assumed that the reader is
familiar with the meaning of "husband's separate property,"
"wife's separate property," and "ordinary community property;"
however, because of differences in phraseology, the term "special
community property" may not be a familiar one, and so it will
be defined. "Special community property" is used herein to mean
the rents and revenues' from the wife's separate real estate, the in-
terest on bonds and notes belonging to her individually, dividends
on stocks individually owned by her, and her personal earnings.
For the purposes of brevity and clarity, this article will be
divided into eight parts, dealing respectively with the liability of
the various properties to sale under court process for the following
unsecured obligations: (1) the husband's prenuptial debts); (2)
his postnuptial debts; (3) his prenuptial torts; (4) his postnuptial
torts; (5) the wife's prenuptial debts; (6) her postnuptial debts;
(7) her prenuptial torts; and (8) her postnuptial torts. It is
assumed, of course, that enforcement of these liabilities is sought
after the marriage. All property mentioned is assumed to be non-
exempt under the general exemption statutes. The statutes here.
inafter discussed which impose liability on the various types of
marital property create no liens, of course; liens are obtainable
on such property by execution, attachment, garnishment or re-
cording an abstract of judgment.
1 Bearden v. Knight, 19 Tex. S. Ct. Reporter 323 (1950)-involving crops.
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1. PROPERTY LIABLE FOR THE HUSBAND'S PRENUPTIAL DEBTS
No statute has been passed specifically covering liability for
such debts, but Article 4616 t8 protects the wife's separate property
and special community property from "debts contracted by the
husband" (and from his torts). Thus the meaning of "husband"
is of the highest importance; does it have its literal meaning,
"the man after marriage" and then only, or does it mean "the
man" at all times? A majority of Texas cases have construed the
statute as applying to prenuptial as well as postnuptial debts and
thus have construed "husband" as meaning "the man." Notable
among these cases is llich v. Household Furniture Co.,' wherein
the court stated:
"The statute [Art. 4616] exempts such rents [from a building
owned separately by the wife] from the 'payment of debts contracted
by the husband.' This language is plain and unambiguous. It is broad
and makes no distinction between antenuptial and postnuptial debts.
No such distinction can properly be implied."'
Other cases,4 both state and federal, have agreed with the reason-
ing of the llich case.
One Commission of Appeals opinion by Judge Ocie Speer,
Crim et al. v. Austin,' reasoned that both ordinary and special
community property should be liable for the husband's prenuptial
debts. (It should be noted that the opinion was not adopted by
the Supreme Court.) Judge Speer reasoned that nothing in the
statutes indicates that the entire community is not liable for
la TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon 1925) art. 4616. "Neither the separate property of
the wife, nor the rents from the wife's separate real estate, nor the interest on bonds
and notes belonging to her, nor dividends on stocks owned by her, nor her personal
earnings, shall be subject to the payment of debts contracted by the husband nor of
torts of the husband."
2 103 S. W. (2d) 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ of error refused.
8 Id. at 874.
4 In Re Gutierrez 33 F. 2d 987, (D. C. S. D. Tax., 1929); Armstrong v. Turbeville,
216 S. W. 1101 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), writ of error dismissed; Hawkins v. Britton
State Bank, 52 S. W. 2d 243 (Tex. Com. App. 1932), opinion adopted by Supreme Court.




such debts; in other words, that "husband" means "the mar-
ried man." This argument would probably be supported by Ar-
ticle 4613, exempting the husband's separate property, which
says "debts contracted by the wife, either before or after mar-
riage," therefore arguably implying that the word "husband" in
Article 4616, which lacks the added phrase "before or after mar-
riage," means literally the married man only-except that such
an interpretation of Article 4616 would produce the amazing im-
plication that the wife's separate property is liable for the hus-
band's prenuptial debts. Judge Speer also reasoned that total
community liability is fairer, since decisions have held all the
community property, both ordinary and special, liable for the
wife's antenuptial debts (as more fully set out later in this
article).
However, Article 4616 was drawn in an effort to protect the
wife's half of the special community property from execution for
the husband's debts, and the interpretation in the llich case and
those cases following it seems far the stronger. One reason is if
"husband" in Article 4616 were interpreted literally, so as to
imply that special community property is liable for his prenuptial
debts, there might be an inference that the wife's separate property
is liable-truly a shocking result. Another reason is, the wife
receives benefit from many of the husband's debts after marriage,
and little or no benefit from his debts before marriage; since the
statute undoubtedly exempts special community property, emanat-
ing from the wife's property and labor, from the former debts, a
fortiori it should be interpreted to exempt such property from the
latter debts.
The Mlich and Crim cases are very probably reconcilable, per-
haps on the basis that the Crim case is right on its facts (involving
situation No. 5, infra), but wrong in its dictum as to the hus-
band's prenuptial debts. This would explain the Supreme Court's
non-adoption of the Crim opinion and its refusal of writ of error
in the Mllich case.
[Vol. IV
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Of course, the husband's separate property would be liable for
his prenuptial debts. Before his marriage that property was his
only property, and of course would have been liable for his debts.
It would be most surprising if such liability did not continue
after marriage. Furthermore, the inference from Article 4613's
exclusions from liability is, that such property is liable for the
husband's prenuptial debts. Ordinary community property is also
liable, under the clear implication of Article 4616.
The writer reaches the conclusion that the husband's separate
property and ordinary community property are liable for the
husband's prenuptial debts, while special community property is
probably not liable, and the wife's separate property is clearly
not liable, under the terms of Article 4616.6
2. PROPERTY LIABLE FOR THE HUSBAND'S POSTNUPTIAL DEBTS
It seems that the husband's separate property and ordinary
community property are also liable for the postnuptial debts of
the husband. Article 4616, previously mentioned, exempts the
wife's separate property and special community property from
such liability, and Article 4620' limits exceptions to community
liability for "debts contracted during marriage" to those speci-
ally excepted by statute. In 1927, a Court of Civil Appeals, con-
sidering these two statutes in conjunction with one another, reached
the conclusion that a crop produced on the wife's separate land,
which the court treated as special community property, was not
subject to the husband's postnuptial debts.' The famous case of
Arnold v. Leonard,' while holding unconstitutional that part of
Article 4621, R.C.S. 1911 (now Article 4616) which attempted
to declare the rents and revenues of the wife's separate realty to
6 See also notes, 16 TEx. L. REv. 579 (1938) ; 16 TEX. L. REv. 110 (1937) ; 23 TaX.
JUR. § 156; SPEER, LAw OF MARITAL RIcHTS IN TEXAS, § 385, p. 465 (3rd ed. 1929).
7 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 4620. "The community property of the
husband and wife shall be liable for their debts contracted during marriage, except in
such cases as are specially excepted by law."
8 Teague v. Burk, 3 S. W. (2d) 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
9 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
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be her separate estate, held nevertheless that the provisions render-
ing the rents of the wife's separate lands free from liability for
debts contracted by the husband, were valid. Thus special com-
munity property, and certainly the wife's separate property, ap-
pear to be exempt from liability for the husband's postnuptial
debts, while his own separate property and ordinary community
property seem to be liable for the debts which he then contracts.' 0
3. PROPERTY LIABLE FOR THE HUSBAND'S PRENUPTIAL TORTS
Apparently no Texas cases to date have directly decided this
point, but it would seem that the sounder view is, once again, that
special community property, as well as the wife's separate
property, are exempt. Remember that Article 4616 exempted
special community property and the wife's separate property
from "torts of the husband." Again the question presents itself
as to whether the word "husband" is to be interpreted to mean
"the married man" or "the man." Under the reasoning of the lich
case, previously cited, the statute would seem to refer to "the
man," both before and after marriage. While that case was con-
sidering the subjection of special community property to a hus-
band's antenuptial debts, the wording of the statute would seem
to make the same reasoning applicable to his prenuptial torts.
The court said:
"It would be unreasonable to impute to the Legislature, in the en-
actment of article 4616, an intention to subject the rents from the
wife's separate property [this being special community property] to
the payment of the husband's antenuptial debts and exempt such
rents from the payment of community postnuptial debts of the hus-
band, .. -.
The husband's separate property is certainly liable for his pre-
marital torts, on the same reasoning as was used in discussing his
premarital debts. 2
I" See also notes, 16 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1938) ; 16 TEX. L. REv. 110 (1937) ; 23 Tex.
Jur. § 156; SPEER, op. cit. supra, note 6 at § 382, p. 462.
11 103 S. W. (2d) 873, 874.
12 See also SPEER, op. cit. supra, note 6 at § 387, p. 468.
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4. PROPERTY LIABLE FOR THE HUSBAND'S POSTNUPTIAL TORTS
This topic needs only scant consideration. Article 4613's ex-
cepts the separate property of the husband from liability only for
debts contracted by the wife (except for necessaries) and her
torts. Article 4616, previously cited, exempts from liability for
the husband's torts the separate property of the wife and special
community property. Considering these articles, together with the
lllich case, leads one to the conclusion that both the husband's
separate property and ordinary community property are liable
for his postnuptial torts. Some of the reasoning in the Crim case,
previously discussed, might lead one to the conclusion that the
special community property would be liable for such torts, but
the plain wording of Article 4616 seems to preclude such a possi-
bility. "Husband" certainly means the man while married,
whether or not it also means the man before marriage.'
5. PROPERTY LIABLE FOR THE WIFE'S PRENUPTIAL DEBTS
The plain wording of Article 4613 exempts the separate prop-
erty of the husband from such liability ("debts contracted by the
wife, either before or after marriage"), and Crane v. Robert &
St. John Motor Co. 5 has so held. As to special community prop-
erty, it is closest akin to the wife's separate property, since it is
(except her earnings) the fruits of her separate property; and
the reason for exempting such property from liability for the
husband's premarital debts is not present here, where the pre-
nuptial debt is that of the wife. As to ordinary community prop.
erty, Articles 4621 and 4623 probably do not present the problem
13 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 4613. "All property of the husband,
both real and personal, owned or claimed by him before marriage, and that acquired
afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, as also the increase of all lands thus acquired,
shall be his separate property. The separate property of the husband shall not be sub-
ject to the debts contracted by the wife, either before or after marriage, except for
necessaries furnished herself and children after her marriage with him, nor for torts
of the wife..."
14 See also Babcock v. Tum, 156 F. (2d) 116 (C.C.A. 9th, 1946); note, 25 TEx. L.
REV. 534 (1947) ; 23 TEX. JUy. §§ 160 and 254.
1542 S. W. (2d) 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) no writ of error history.
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of dual meaning of the word "wife." Both refer to her debts
"except for necessaries furnished herself and children"; that
probably implies that "wife" in those statutes is to be interpreted
with exact literalness (though this conclusion is slightly clouded
by Article 4613's phrase "except for necessaries furnished herself
and children after her marriage with him," and though "wife"
could mean the woman at all times, with the exceptions probably
including only necessaries after marriage). Article 4620, provid-
ing for both spouses' debts after marriage, probably is not im-
pliedly opposed to the preceding conclusion as to prenuptial debts.
Thus, assuming that "wife" means only "the married woman,"
the implication of Articles 4621 and 4623 is, that all the com-
munity property is liable for the wife's prenuptial debts. The
Crim case so reasons, more persuasively than its similar argu-
ment as to the husband; 6 and though this Commission of Appeals
opinion was not adopted, the case is a Supreme Court holding
that all the community property is liable for the wife's prenuptial
debts. Dunlap v. Squires17 makes a similar holding. Thus the cases
and the better reasoning seem to impel the conclusion that only
the husband's separate property is exempt from the wife's pre-
nuptial debts; thus the wife's separate property and both species
of community property are liable therefor."8
6. PROPERTY LIABLE FOR THE WIFE'S POSTNUPTIAL DEBTS
Articles 462119 and 462320 must be considered together in deter-
mining such liability. Article 4621 exempts community property
from the wife's debts, except for necessaries for herself and her
16 6 S. W. (2d) 348, 349.
17 186 S. W. 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
18 See also SPEER, op. cit. supra, note 6 at § 384, p. 464.
19 TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 4621. "The community property of the
husband and wife shall not be liable for debts or damages resulting from contracts of
the wife except for necesaries furnished herself and children, unless the husband joins
in the execution of the contract; provided, that her rights with reference to the com-
munity property on permanent abandonment by the husband shall not be affected by
this provision."
20 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's 1925) art. 4623. "Neither the separate property
of the husband nor the community property other than the personal earnings of the wife,
[Vol. IV
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children; and Article 4623 exempts the husband's separate prop-
erty, plus ordinary community property, from such liability, re-
peating the exception as to necessaries. It is evident that Article
4621 refers only to ordinary community property, when it is read
with Article 4623, and not to special community property. Straus
v. Shamblin" agrees with this conclusion, holding that only the
husband's separate property and ordinary community property are
exempt from the wife's postnuptial debts; and this same conclu-
sion is reached in the Crim case.22 It is apparent, then, that the
wife's property and special community property are liable for the
wife's postnuptial debts when such are not incurred for necessaries
for herself and her children.
The above-stated rules would of course apply to the wife's valid
contracts, and also to her voidable contracts which she does not
avoid.2 3
Suppose the husband joins in the execution of the wife's con-
tract. Article 4621 says: "The community property .. .shall not
be liable for ... contracts of the wife except for necessaries...
unless the husband joins in the execution of the contract." This
implies that "the community property"-apparently all of it-is
liable if he joins; and this clearly seems to be right if he joins as
a party, for then it is his contract, too, and under the rules evolved
above would make all types of marital property liable. Suppose
he joins merely pro forma; is this joining, within the meaning of
the statute? This question apparently has not been settled, but the
answer would appear to be, no.
The wife's contracts for necessaries are governed by Articles
4621 and 4623, which imply that the husband's separate property
and all the community property are liable therefor. However,
several very different situations arise, depending on the wife's in-
and the income, rents and revenues from her separate- property, shall be subject to the
payment of debts contracted by the wife, except those contracted for necessaries fur-
nished her by her children.. .."
21 120 S. W. (2d) 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) writ of error dismissed.
22 6 S. W. (2d) 348, 349.
•28 See comment this issue. "The Wife's Contracts."
1950]
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tent and that of the third party contracting with her. If their intent
is to charge the husband with liability, and not the wife, it would
seem that only his separate property and the ordinary commu-
nity property are liable. If the parties rely on her credit alone, it
would seem that only her separate property and special community
property are liable. If the contracting parties look to the credit of
both spouses, all separate and community property is liable.
It is possible that the wife's contract for the benefit of her sepa-
rate estate might bind the husband, too, and thereby make liable
all types of marital property.24 This is squarely opposed to Article
4623, but Articles 1984 and 1985 perhaps imply this result by
their similar treatment of such contracts and contracts for neces-
saries.2"
7. PROPERTY LIABLE FOR THE WIFE'S PRENUPTIAL TORTS
Article 4613, previously mentioned, exempts the husband's sep-
arate property from "torts of the wife," to which should doubtless
be added the phrase "either before or after marriage" which occurs
in the same sentence immediately after reference to her debts;
otherwise, the astounding result might be reached that the hus-
band's separate property is liable here. Article 4623, while limit-
ing the liability of the community property for the wife's contracts,
does not mention her torts; this seems to imply that all community
property is liable for all of her torts, prenuptial and postnuptial.
Next, let us compare this statute, dealing with the wife's obliga-
tions, and Article 4616, dealing with the husband's obligations.
The latter statute's mentioning his torts-including (as concluded
supra) his prenuptial torts-and the former statute's not mention-
ing her torts at all, add up to a powerful implication that all com-
munity property is liable for the wife's prenuptial torts. Thus
24 SPEEM, op. cit. supra, note 6 at § 182; 23 TEX. JUR. 209; See Farm & Home Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n. v. Abernathy, 102 S. W. (2d) 410, (Tex. Comm. App. 1937).
25 See also Gohlam, Lester Co. v. Whittle, 114 Tex. 584, 273 S. W. 808 (1925);
note, 11 TEX. L. REv. 81 (1932) ; 23 TEx. Jua. § 157; SPEEa, op. cit. supra, note 6 at
§ 169, p. 229; § 175, p. 233; § 382, p. 462; § 384, p. 464.
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there is no statutory exemption from liability for the wife's pre-
marital torts except the husband's separate property.
The Crim case"' reasons with considerable force that all of the
community property is liable for the wife's prenuptial torts. Thus
it seems, from analysis of the statutes and apparently the only
case discussing the point, that all of the community property, both
ordinary and special, and also the wife's separate property, would
be liable for her prenuptial torts.
8. PROPERTY LIABLE FOR THE WIFE'S POSTNUPTIAL TORTS
Article 4623, while exempting ordinary community property
from the wife's postnuptial debts (except for necessaries) does not
mention her torts, and therefore creates no such exemption there-
from. In accord with this reasoning, a Supreme Court case, Seins.
heimer v" Burkhart,2" and several other cases29 hold that all the
community property, both ordinary and special, is liable for the
wife's postnuptial torts. The Crim case concurs."0 Judge Speer,
writing again in Texas Jurisprudence, in discussing Article 4616
and Article 4623 comes to the same conclusion.3 Article 4613
still exempts the husband's separate property from such liability,
and Jackson v. Dickey, 2 a Commission of Appeals case, concludes
that this exemption should be made. Certainly there can be little
doubt that the wife's separate property is liable for her postnup-
tial as well as her prenuptial, torts. Thus her separate property
and all community property are liable for the wife's postnuptial
torts.3
216 S. W. (2d) 348, 349.
27 See also SPEER, op. cit. supra, note 6 at § 387, p. 468; § 299, p. 370; § 301, p. 372;
§ 302, p. 373.
28 122 Tex. 336, 122 S. W. (2d) 1063 (1939).
29 Patterson et at. v. Frazor, 93 S. W. 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) ; Scott v. Brazile,
292 S. W. 185 (1927); Campbell v. Johnson, 284 S. W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App., 1926)
affirmed in 290 S. W. 526; First Nat. Bank in Houston v. Finn, 132 S. W. (2d) 151
(Tex. Civ. App., 1939) writ of error dismissed.
306 S. W. (2d) 348, 349.
31 23 TEx. Jui. 192.
32 281 S. W. 1043 (Tex. Com. App., 1926) opinion not adopted.




Thus the basic framework of liability is uniform in all the
eight situations discussed above; i.e., the husband's obligations
are collectible from his separate property and ordinary commu-
nity property, and the wife's obligations from her separate prop-
erty and special community property. In three of the situations,
there is an additional liability; viz., all of the community property,
ordinary and special, is liable for the wife's prenuptial debts,
her prenuptial torts and her postnuptial torts. At first thought, this
differentiation seems incongruous and insupportable. Why, for
example, should there be a different rule of liability for the hus.
band's premarital obligations and the wife's? Or why should there
be a difference between her debts after marriage and her torts?
First, the differences are supported (as discussed supra) by the
rather clear statutory implications. The statutes present a laby-
rinth of negative statements; by excluding liability, in the various
situations, of certain segments of the marital property, they there-
by imply that all other segments are liable.
Second, the apparently haphazard differences turn out to be
supported by a consistent and probably well-considered policy.
As Judge Speer says in the Crim case, the principal property which
many (and probably most) wives have (at least, early in mar-
riage before they have inherited anything) is their half interest in
ordinary community property-the principal item being usually
the husband's salary. Therefore, if ordinary community property
is exempted, the wife's liabilities will very frequently be uncol-
lectible.
Let us test that thought by applying it to the various situations.
First, the wife's prenuptial debts and torts, for which as a feme
sole any propery she owned and also her salary after she collected
it, were liable. Suppose that (as is probably true in the great ma-
REV. 534 (1947); 3 TEx. L. REV. 209 (1925) : Burnett v. Cobb, 262 S. W. 826 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924); Campbell v. Johnson, 284 S. W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); note,
5 TEX. L. REV. 110 (1926); 23 TEX. JUR. § 160, § 251, § 254; SeERt, op. cit. supra,
note 6 at § 299, p. 370; § 301, p. 372; § 302, p. 373.
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jority of cases) at marriage she had little or no property and that
she was not thereafter employed for any substantial period; if
ordinary community property is exempted, her prior obligees
would be forestalled. Therefore, if such creditors are to be pro-
tected, the ordinary community property must be liable.
How does this compare with the husband's prenuptial debts and
torts? If he has no property at marriage, he will nevertheless in
almost all cases have a salary, which by the rules developed above
will be liable (after he has collected it) for such obligations. Thus
what seems an arbitrary distinction and discrimination proves to
be essential, in probably the great majority of marriages, if the
wife's premarital creditors are to have a fighting chance of col-
lecting.
The above argument is weakened by the fact that a very large
percentage of wives get jobs during the early years of marriage
and thereby have special community property which would be
liable. This is of accentuated importance because limitation
periods on the premarital debts and torts are short; i.e., during
the period when the creditors must act, there are frequently earn-
ings of the wife which theoretically at least can be reached. An
extensive special study would be prerequisite to a reliable con-
clusion, but the probabilities are, that the great majority of mar-
riages are described by the preceding assumption that the wife has
little or no property and little or no salary. Certainly the assump-
tion was true when the statutes were written. Certainly the pres-
ent-day trend is, as to salary, in the opposite direction, with an
unprecedented number of working wives due to high living costs.
The foregoing argument (for differentiation in favor of the
wife's prenuptial debts and torts) is strengthened by the holding
in Strickland v. Wester,3 adopted by the Supreme Court. If prop-
erty bought with the wife's earnings is (unlike the earnings) ordi-
nary community property-which seems a correct result under
Article 4616-then the wife's creditors will be further handi-
84 112 S. W. (2d) 1047 (Tex. Com. App. 1938).
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capped unless they can reach ordinary community property. The
principle of the case might even be extended to the other items of
special community property.
Finally, what basis is there for a different liability for the wife's
debts after marriage and her torts thereafter? The rationale as to
her torts is identical with that just stated as to her prenupial obli-
gations: most wives' principal (or only) property is their interest
in ordinary community property. As to her debts, a wife's con-
tracts are voidable except for half a dozen authorized types.35 As
to the voidable contracts, the theory apparently is, creditors should
beware; their dealings with minors are slightly analogous. As to
her authorized, valid contracts, reference is made to another article
in this issue; here, in summary, it may be said that all types there-
of (with a relatively few exceptional instances under one or two
types) either bind the husband or exist only when she has sepa-
rate property-except for emergency contracts, which very prob-
ably bind all the community property.36 If the husband is bound,
ordinary community property and his separate property) are lia-
ble; if the wife has separate property, it and its revenues (special
community property) are liable. Thus on principle there is a basis
for different rules of liability for the wife's debts after marriage
and her torts; and the rule (developed above) allowing a nar-
rower liability for such debts is not unfair to creditors.
Perhaps there would be considerable strength to the argument
that the wife's creditors (in the three situations discussed above)
should be allowed to reach only her half of ordinary community
property. If such a result were desired, this would require a basic
change in the present law,87 probably by statute. It is somewhat
85 See comment in this issue, "The Wife's Contracts."
96 See comment, 4 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 112 (1950).
87 Jackson v. Dickey, 281 S. W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926) ; Stamper v. Scholtz,
17 S. W. (2d) 184 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929) no writ of error history; Foster v. Hack.
worth, 164 S. W. (2d) 796, 798 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) no writ of error history; First
Nat. Bank in Houston v. Finn, 132 S. W. (2d) 151, 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) writ of
error dismissed; but see Cullum v. Lowe, 9 S. W. 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) no writ
of error history.
[Vol. IV
